1	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT				
2					
	FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON				
3	LISA MCFALLS, MICHAEL MCFALLS,) FRED WOODRING, and COMMUNITY ) ACTION RESOURCE ENTERPRISES, ) INC., )				
4					
5	Plaintiffs,	Case No. 3:16-cv-2116-SI			
6	)	Case NO. 3:10-CV-2110-S1			
7	v. )				
8	THOMAS J. VILSACK, Secretary ) of the Department of ) Agriculture, et al., )	May 10, 2022			
9	Defendants.	Portland, Oregon			
10	Defendancs.	FOICIAIIU, OIEGOII			
11					
12					
13					
14					
15	Motion	Hearing			
16		conference)			
	-				
17		F PROCEEDINGS			
18	BEFORE THE HONORAB	LE MICHAEL H. SIMON			
19	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE				
20					
21					
22					
23					
24					
25					

1			
2	APPEARANCES		
3			
4	FOR THE PLAINTIFFS:		
5		National Housing Law Project 703 Market Street, Suite 2000 San Francisco, CA	
6			
7		Mr. Edward Johnson	
8		Oregon Law Center State Support Unit 522 S.W. Fifth Avenue, No. 812	
9		Portland, OR 97204	
10			
11		Mr. Michael A. Pijanowski Legal Aid Services of Oregon	
12		230 N.E. Second Avenue, Suite F Hillsboro, OR 97124	
13		HIIISDOIO, OR 9/124	
14			
15	FOR THE DEFENDANTS:	Mr. Sean E. Martin Mr. Joshua Keller (by telephone)	
16		United States Attorney's Office District of Oregon	
17		1000 S.W. Third Avenue, Suite 600 Portland, OR 97204	
18		FOICIAIU, OK 97204	
19			
20			
21	COURT REPORTER:	Bonita J. Shumway, CSR, RMR, CRR United States District Courthouse	
22		1000 S.W. Third Avenue, Room 301 Portland, OR 97204	
23		(503)326-8188 bonita shumway@ord.uscourts.gov	
24		Doile a_Silulliway@ord.uscoures.gov	
25			

(PROCEEDINGS)1 2 (May 10, 2022; 3:01 p.m.) \* \* \* \* 3 THE COURT: Good afternoon, everyone. This is Judge 4 We are here in the case of Lisa McFalls, et al. versus 5 Secretary Thomas J. Vilsack, et al., Case No. 3:16-cv-2116. We 6 7 are here for argument on defendants' motion to dismiss, Docket 128. 8 And I'll invite first counsel for plaintiffs to enter 9 your appearance by video. 10 MR. ANDERS: Judge Simon, my apologies, but for some 11 12 reason my video is not showing up. 13 THE COURT: All right. Well, that sounds like 14 Mr. Anders. Am I correct, sir? 15 MR. ANDERS: It is Mr. Anders, yes, sir. 16 THE COURT: Okay. You can either try to reconnect or we'll just hear you by audio, whatever you prefer. 17 MR. ANDERS: Well, I wouldn't mind being seen, but I 18 don't know --19 20 THE COURT: If you want, I'll be glad to wait if you 21 want to disconnect and try connecting back in if you wish. 22 That's fine with me. I think it's better to be heard and not 23 seen than seen and not heard, but let's give it a try for both. 24 (There is a pause in the proceedings.) 25 THE COURT: Mr. Anders.

1 MR. ANDERS: Yes. 2 We can hear you but we do not see you, THE COURT: 3 and I cannot explain why. MR. ANDERS: Well, neither can I, unfortunately. 4 I think this is the best we can do right 5 THE COURT: 6 now. 7 MR. ANDERS: Okay. My apologies because I'm going to be arquing, so --8 9 THE COURT: That's fine. No apology needed. 10 So we have Gideon Anders representing plaintiffs. 11 Is anyone else -- Michael, do you want to enter your 12 appearance? 13 MR. PIJANOWSKI: Yes, Your Honor. Michael Pijanowski 14 for plaintiffs. 15 THE COURT: Good afternoon to you as well. 16 Mr. Johnson, do you want to enter your appearance? MR. JOHNSON: Yes. 17 Ed Johnson, also for plaintiffs, 18 Your Honor. 19 THE COURT: Appearing for defendant, Mr. Martin. 20 Would you enter your appearance. And you are woefully 21 outnumbered. 22 MR. MARTIN: Yes. I'll have to fight a little 23 harder, Judge. I'm joined here on the telephone with my 24 colleague, Assistant U.S. Attorney Josh Keller. THE COURT: All right. Good afternoon, Mr. Martin 25

and Mr. Keller.

As you all know, I previously sent a tentative opinion and order to all counsel. You're welcome to argue whatever you wish. I think since the tentative opinion leans towards granting the motion, I think it's most efficient for me to turn to plaintiffs' counsel first to tell me have I misunderstood any of the factual material stated in my tentative opinion and order? Have I misunderstood any of the legal material that I've relied upon? And welcome to make any other arguments you wish, and both sides obviously are welcome to tell me if there's been any changed circumstances since the time that I sent my tentative order.

So, Mr. Anders, the floor is yours.

MR. ANDERS: Thank you, Judge Simon. I really appreciate your granting us this hearing.

Before going to the substantive issues relating to the tentative opinion, I'd like to make clear for purposes of this argument, we concede that the individual plaintiffs' claims are moot. However, we believe that CARE, an organization serving the housing needs of people living and wanting to live in Tillamook County, is entitled to continue to argue for both the declaratory and injunctive relief that it sought when this case was filed, specifically that the regulations and policies that the agency is using to evaluate prepayments and operate the voucher program are contrary to law

and that the agency should be enjoined from relying on them in the future.

CARE's primary issue with respect to the tentative opinion is that it ignores and contradicts the Court's February 2018 decision with respect to the continued applicability and scope of the voluntary cessation exception and thereby erroneously justifies limiting the relief available to CARE. The key statement in the tentative opinion asserts that the voluntary cessation -- voluntary cessation exception no longer applies because, "Defendants have not merely ceased the challenged conduct. Instead, the plaintiffs' claims are moot because a nonparty has purchased Golden Eagle and assumed the Section 515 loan."

This statement is simply wrong. Moreover, contrary to the tentative opinion, if the voluntary cessation exception applies, CARE should not have to file a new lawsuit should another prepayment be filed in Tillamook County.

Since the beginning of this case, there have been two forms of conduct that the plaintiffs have challenged. First, the agency's reliance on the regulations that are contrary to ELIHPA in determining an owner's eligibility to prepay a loan; and second, its operation of the voucher program in an arbitrary and capricious manner. In both cases, the plaintiffs ask for declaratory relief that the conduct was illegal and an injunction preventing its recurrence.

After the defendants voluntarily withdrew their initial decision and decided that the GE loan could not be prepaid until the property was offered for sale, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that under the ordinary standard for assessing mootness, the plaintiffs' claims were moot. The plaintiffs and ultimately the Court disagreed because the case fell within the voluntary cessation exception to mootness, and that under that exception, the case was not moot.

In reaching the decision, the Court undertook a lengthy discussion of the origins and purpose of the exception, focusing on the Supreme Court's Laidlaw decision, which held that the mere cessation of allegedly illegal conduct does not moot a case, because if it did, the defendants in the case would be free to return to its old ways. Laidlaw decided that under the voluntary cessation exception, it is assumed that the case is moot if the ordinary standard for determining mootness is used. Critically, the voluntary cessation exception shifts the burden -- consistently described as a heavy burden -- to the defendants to show that it is absolutely clear that the defendants' alleged behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.

In reaching the conclusion that the RD defendants did not meet this burden, the Court pointed out several times that the mere cessation of illegal conduct was not sufficient to

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

meet the defendants' burden because the same regulations and procedures are still in place, and the allegedly wrongful behavior can reasonably be expected to recur. For example, in reaching the decision that the defendants did not meet their heavy burden of showing that the challenged action will not recur, the Court cited and relied on plaintiffs' argument that "If RD does not change its allegedly improper regulations or start using proper prepayment standards of review, RD will continue to violate ELIHPA, which will continue to frustrate CARE's mission and increase CARE's financial and personnel burdens in Tillamook County. CARE will have to spend more time assisting its clients in finding affordable housing, challenging RD's illegal acceptance of prepayment requests, and providing additional financial assistance. Additionally, at oral argument counsel for CARE confirmed that CARE would continue to file lawsuits in the future if additional properties received prepayment approval."

Thus CARE met the requirements for invoking the voluntary cessation exception.

Notably the Court, relying on the Ninth Circuit opinion in *Rosemere*, specifically found that the defendants' burden is not met just because no other prepayment application is currently pending in Tillamook. The Court stated that it is not an insurmountable hurdle or extremely unlikely that a property in Tillamook County will seek repayment in the future

and CARE will challenge RD's process for considering such a repayment.

The Court's earlier opinion notwithstanding, the tentative opinion now states that the defendants have ceased to challenge conduct and that CARE's case is moot because GE has been sold and its loan assumed by a third party, namely Northwest Coastal.

This is simply not true. There is no evidence to support the statement that the defendants have ceased to challenge conduct. The same regulations and policies that were in place in 2016 and 2018 continue to exist, and RD has made no statement whatsoever that it plans to change its conduct in the future. To the contrary, once this case is dismissed, it is not merely free but is required to rely on the challenged regulations and practices and revert to its old conduct.

The fact that GE was preserved and sold to Northwest Coastal also does not show any change in the defendants' position. First, plaintiffs did not and could not have brought an action to force a sale and to preserve GE. There is no statute or regulation that authorizes such a claim. All the plaintiffs sought was for RD to properly determine whether the prepayment should be approved. If CARE could not force the preservation of GE, its sale and preservation are not evidence that the agency has ceased the illegal activity.

Second, the sale and preservation of GE are actions

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

directly derivative of the agency's decision to voluntarily withdraw its earlier prepayment decision. There are not subsequent factual development -- developments that moot plaintiffs' earlier claims that the case is not moot. All the agency actions made after the agency withdrew its earlier decision were ministerial, made by third parties or were required by statute. The decision to make and accept the purchase offer were outside the agency's control. The decision where the Northwest Coastal was a nonprofit eligible to purchase GE was ministerial. The agency's decision to increase the number of units that GE assisted by rental assistance, its decision to allow Northwest Coastal to assume the outstanding loan, and the agency's decision to provide Northwest Coastal with financing to buy out the owner were all decisions that the agency was required by statute to take, 42 U.S.C. Section 1472(c)(5)(C). Thus, they were derivative of the initial agency withdrawal of its prepayment decision and do not reflect any change in the agency's position.

It follows that the tentative opinion's statement that the voluntary cessation exception no longer applies to the case, that only GE is at issue in this case, and that CARE is not entitled to further relief because it does not challenge any other prepayment pending in Tillamook County are all wrong. The voluntary cessation exception is intended to prevent RD from approving future prepayments using the challenged

regulations, and as the Court previously decided, CARE does not have to show that other prepayments are pending because it improperly shifts the burden from the defendants to the plaintiff.

In short, the tentative opinion has failed to properly conclude that the defendants have not met their burden of showing that the challenged conduct will not recur. It is for these reasons that CARE asks that the Court deny the defendants' motion to dismiss and allow the plaintiffs to proceed to file a motion for summary judgment on their remaining claims.

Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Anders.

I think I have a question for you, but I first want to hear from Mr. Martin, and then I'll come back to you, probably with my question, and of course give you an opportunity to respond to whatever Mr. Martin says.

Mr. Martin.

MR. MARTIN: Thank you, Your Honor.

We think that your tentative opinion and order is accurate and well-founded. We don't think there have been any new circumstances since you shared that tentative ruling with the parties.

Judge, it's agreed by all that this is an as-applied challenge to the USDA's decision making with regard to the

Golden Eagle II apartment complex. It doesn't relate to other properties. That's not a disputed matter.

But where we differ sharply with Mr. Anders' perspective is we believe -- and we believe the Court recognizes this -- that circumstances have changed fundamentally and dramatically with the fact that this is no longer a scenario with a private owner seeking prepayment with Golden Eagle II, but that in fact a new nonprofit owner has agreed to enter new financing, and most importantly remain bound by Section 515 of the Housing Act for the next -- well, I should say until late 2051. Even if there's a title transfer, this project is protected to late 2051.

It's much more than just USDA changing its mind about a civil rights impact analysis with the prior owner, Judge. That's where it's a different set of circumstances than when the Court looked at it in 2018, in denying that motion to dismiss. Now, Judge, in many ways this is really out of the government's hands. You know, we have Northwest Coastal Housing that has agreed to a restrictive use covenant, agreed to new financing, and put everybody in the world on notice that the protections that are in place are going to remain in place. There's no evidence that Northwest Coastal Housing has any interest in prepayment, having just in fact entered new financing just about four months ago.

We don't think there's any type of scenario that's

live with regard to this project, as applied to this project, Judge. USDA entered this agreement. Northwest Coastal Housing has agreed to use restrictions and to the Housing Act protections for the tenants until late 2051. There's almost -- there's very little the government can do at this point because so much of this is now with a new owner and doesn't involve anything like the scenarios we had when it was with the previous owner.

I would also add, Judge, that Mr. Anders' point about, well, what if somebody else -- what if another housing complex applies for prepayment? Judge, that's just -- we don't know if or when another project in Tillamook County or somewhere else might be interested in prepayment. That's simply an unknown and doesn't relate to this as-applied challenge in this case.

And, you know, as you pointed out in your tentative opinion and order, that's going to be a new set of facts and a new set of circumstances if and when another project somewhere else enters this type of prepayment potential scenario, and the facts then might warrant filing a complaint by an interested party, but what might happen in the future somewhere else can't keep this case alive, Judge.

So we would ask that you grant the motion to dismiss. We recognize that would be a dismissal without prejudice, but we don't think that there's anything live in the case at this

juncture, that it's awfully abstract, awfully academic, and let's let this project be managed by Northwest Coastal Housing without litigation on the sides of what should be a good outcome of everybody involved.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Martin.

Let me ask you a follow-up Mr. Martin. You say that it's undisputed between the parties here that plaintiffs are bringing an as-applied challenge relating to the Golden Eagle property. Let's accept that.

If they wanted to bring a facial challenge to the general practices and procedures of Rural Development, how could they do that, and in what court would it be proper?

MR. MARTIN: That's an interesting question, Judge.

I think a challenge to general practices and procedures, I mean, I do have to say that that sets off a bit of an alarm bell in my mind that, you know, given the Administrative Procedure Act being a limited waiver of sovereign immunity, that generally a challenge would have to be tethered to an action, to a final decision that has legal ramifications. So I want to make that point that you would need to find some sort of decision, right, a final agency decision rather than just a generalized challenge aimed at a general policy or aimed at general administration of a program, but I would -- but I would take it back to the APA, Judge. I think that that is probably, I'd say, the leading candidate for the type of challenge. And

I believe it would be within the jurisdiction of the U.S. District Court as well, just like this case was brought under the APA.

I don't know if that answers your question.

THE COURT: Now, a final agency action, that would be the adoption, you know, of a final rule -- right? -- if they wanted to challenge the adoption of a final rule?

MR. MARTIN: Right. If there were a final rule, if it's a facial challenge, there would be an applicable statute of limitations, of course, if this were not an as-applied challenge.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Martin.

Let me go back to you, Mr. Anders. I do have a question to you, and then you're welcome to respond to anything Mr. Martin said.

First question is do you agree with Mr. Martin's comment that all parties agree here that this is an as-applied challenge relating to the Golden Eagle property?

MR. ANDERS: I agree insofar as the difference is whether or not -- it is an as-applied challenge, but what it means is that the statutory -- that the statute of limitation for a facial challenge has lapsed, that the only way that this case can go forward is by an as-applied -- by the decision as applied in this case to GE. It does not, however, relieve the federal government from having to change its regulations

because they have misapplied it in the case of CARE. So the fact that it is an as-applied challenge simply deals with the statute of limitations issue. It does not deal with the relief that CARE is entitled to receive. And that's clearly what the voluntary cessation exception says. It's supposed to stop the agency from continuing to practice -- take illegal actions as it has before.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Now, this is back to the original question that was bothering me. If this is an as-applied challenge relating to the Golden Eagle or GE property, and if based upon the events involving Northwest Coastal Housing, I believe that that dispute is now moot. I'm hearing what you're saying, and I saw this in your papers and I'm hearing it in your argument that there may be other properties in Tillamook County or elsewhere where you object to the way Rural Development is likely to handle things, based upon their past practices. But that strikes me, because it's unrelated and untethered to the Golden Eagle property, that strikes me as essentially asking the Court for an advisory opinion regarding how Rural Development has been handling things and how they're likely to handle things for other properties in the future.

What am I misunderstanding here?

MR. ANDERS: The basic assumption in this case, and the basic situation where the voluntary cessation exception

applies, it assumes that the underlying case is moot, and that's what the Court decided in February 8th of 2018. It held and assumed that the case was moot with respect to GE. But the voluntary cessation exception is designed specifically to allow a party to continue to challenge the practices of the agency, because otherwise the agency could revert to using the same practices over and over again without a challenge.

THE COURT: No, but that's with respect to the underlying issue or party. I understand what you're saying, and the reason why I previously rejected mootness, applying the -- and rejected voluntary cessation as creating mootness was simply because that was a decision by Rural Development.

Here we have something totally different. Here we now have Northwest Coastal Housing having signed a new agreement to deal with Golden Eagle. We're not going to have a problem with Golden Eagle -- at least if we do, it's purely speculative we might have a problem with Golden Eagle. What I hear you saying is, fine, Golden Eagle may be involved. But there may be other low-income housing projects that Rural Development will handle the same way as you complained about the way they originally handled Golden Eagle.

That doesn't strike me as a voluntary cessation problem. That strikes me as now trying to create your same challenge but to other properties, but since there's none at issue, that's what strikes me as an advisory opinion. So it's

not purely a situation dealing with Rural Development, the agency saying, fine, we won't do it that way, and therefore the case is moot. That's not why this case became moot. The case became moot because Northwest Coastal Housing bought the property and took over the loan.

Am I misunderstanding something?

MR. ANDERS: Let me see if I can make my point. In your earlier decision, you clear -- you made it clear that the previous time that the government filed a motion to dismiss, the case was not moot because the case was within the voluntary cessation exception.

THE COURT: Correct.

MR. ANDERS: And at that point in time you clearly pointed out that CARE is concerned about future prepayments, not the prepayment of GE, but future payments of other properties.

THE COURT: If I said that, I might have spoken too broadly. I really think that if CARE would be concerned about future problems with Golden Eagle, that would make sense. I think if I said that about other properties not involving Golden Eagle, I may have misapplied voluntary cessation.

MR. ANDERS: I don't believe that you have, Your Honor, and I'd be more than pleased to, you know, provide you -- I don't have the cases in front of me to suggest that your decision at that point was perfectly fine and perfectly

correct, I just think that, you know, CARE being an independent third party which is concerned about the housing rights of people who are living in Tillamook County, is entitled to challenge the practices of the agency without having continued to challenge essentially whether GE is going to be prepaid again or not.

THE COURT: Well, let me ask you this. Let's suppose this case goes away. Let's say I just dismiss it without prejudice and you choose not to appeal.

By the way, I'll make a comment on appeal in a moment.

So assuming this case goes away, CARE still has its concerns about the way Rural Development handles these types of situations. I get that. Can CARE bring a new lawsuit against Rural Development, and what would that look like? It wouldn't relate to Golden Eagle because I think the Golden Eagle problem is solved, or if it's not, the matter would be speculative to say it's not.

So could they say, based upon the way Rural
Development has handled these situations in the past, CARE is
still concerned going forward, and they want both declaratory
and injunctive relief?

Now, would that be an as-applied challenge? I don't think so. Would that be a facial challenge to the regulations? If so, it might walk into the statute of limitations problem.

So what would it be? And I would think that if CARE filed that type of new lawsuit, the defendants would simply move to dismiss it as essentially asking for an advisory opinion.

What would be the response of CARE and how would that case be any different from our current case?

MR. ANDERS: Well, it wouldn't be any different. It would be identical to this case if another property in Tillamook County sought to prepay.

THE COURT: No, I agree. My question is what if another property didn't seek to prepay. Could you as CARE just bring a case that says, hey, there may be in the future another property that seeks to prepay, we want to clarify now that Rural Development can't do it the way it's previously been doing things, and therefore we want declaratory and injunctive relief, even if you're not talking about any specific property, just simply arguing this could again happen in the future. Could you bring that sort of case? Because my instinct is that I don't think so.

MR. ANDERS: I don't think so either, Your Honor, and that's precisely what the voluntary cessation exception was intended to avoid, having to bring a case where you do not have actions on the part of the defendant which violate the law, and allowing them to repeat.

I'm in fact -- I've been involved now in two, and potentially three cases where the agency has in each instance

chosen to settle the case before there was any decision on the merits, and the plaintiffs in those cases have not been able to challenge the fundamental practice of the agency which is illegal. And that's what I believe the voluntary cessation exception was intended to remedy.

THE COURT: I'm going to take this under advisement, but I've got to tell you I still am very skeptical. On the other hand, I think it would be very, very helpful to have appellate clarification on the scope of the voluntary cessation doctrine. So although no litigant should ever have to worry how a trial judge would feel if they appeal them, I'm giving you blanket assurance right now, I will not be insulted if you appeal this and it turns out that you're right. I'd love to get this case back with a clearer articulation of when voluntary cessation does and doesn't apply from the Ninth Circuit, but I think there's a difference in situation between what we have now with Northwest Coastal and what we had back in 2018. But if I'm wrong, I'm not going to complain about being reversed on this one.

I'll think about it a little bit more, but that's the direction that I'm leaning. Mr. Anders, I do appreciate your argument. I appreciate the care in which you're representing -- that's a strange way of saying it. The care in which you're representing CARE, I respect.

And Mr. Martin, I appreciate your arguments.

I will take it under advisement, but I think I'll try 1 2 to get the decision out relatively soon, especially if I'm going in the direction that I tentatively articulated. 3 So thank you all very much. 4 MR. ANDERS: Would you like us to submit some case 5 6 law? 7 THE COURT: Is there really a case that you think is squarely on point here that you've not previously cited? And 8 by the way, if there is, I will complain that you haven't 9 previously cited it. But is there some case that's really on 10 point? And if so, why didn't you previously cite it? 11 12 MR. ANDERS: Well, because I -- we thought that 13 because of the voluntary cessation exception was applied in the 14 first instance and continued to apply, we didn't have to go out 15 of your previous opinion. 16 THE COURT: I do think, as I put in the tentative opinion, I think this is a different situation than we had in 17 18 2018. I think this is probably best served for the Ninth 19 Circuit. But I'll give it a little bit more thought. 20 But thank you both, and the motion to dismiss is 21 taken under advisement. Thank you all and have a good day. 22 MR. PIJANOWSKI: Thank you, Your Honor. 23 (Proceedings concluded at 3:33 p.m.) 24

25

--000--I certify, by signing below, that the foregoing is a correct transcript of the record of proceedings in the above-entitled cause. A transcript without an original signature or conformed signature is not certified. /s/Bonita J. Shumway June 9, 2022 BONITA J. SHUMWAY, CSR, RMR, CRR DATE Official Court Reporter 

Casa 2:16 av 02116 SI	<b>8</b> ocument 139 Filed 06/27/2	Aid-11,-2/11 of 22
Case 3:16-cv-02116-SI	942 [41 2/9	<b>Aid<sub>H</sub>11</b> <sub>0</sub> e <sup>2</sup> / <sub>2</sub> 141 of 32 aimed [2] 14/22 14/22
MR. ANDERS: [16] 3/11 3/15 3/18 4/1 4/4 4/7 5/14 15/19	<b>812 [1]</b> 2/8 <b>8188 [1]</b> 2/23	al [3] 1/8 3/5 3/6
16/24 18/7 18/13 18/22 20/6	8th [1] 17/2	<b>alarm [1]</b> 14/15
20/19 22/5 22/12		alive [1] 13/22
MR. JOHNSON: [1] 4/17	9	<b>all [12]</b> 3/13 4/25 5/2 5/3 9/20
MR. MARTIN: [4] 4/22 11/19	<b>97124 [1]</b> 2/12	10/4 10/14 10/23 11/24 15/17
14/13 15/8	<b>97204 [3]</b> 2/9 2/17 2/22	22/4 22/21
MR. PIJANOWSKI: [2] 4/13	A	alleged [1] 7/21
22/22		allegedly [3] 7/13 8/2 8/7
THE COURT: [24]	able [1] 21/2	allow [3] 10/12 11/9 17/4 allowing [1] 20/23
_	<b>about [12]</b> 12/13 12/24 13/10 17/20 18/14 18/18 18/20 19/2	almost [1] 13/4
-00 [41 22/2	19/13 20/15 21/18 21/20	also [3] 4/17 9/17 13/9
<b>000</b> [1] 23/2	above [1] 23/6	although [1] 21/10
1	above-entitled [1] 23/6	am [4] 3/14 16/23 18/6 21/7
/s/Bonita [1] 23/9	absolutely [1] 7/20	analysis [1] 12/14
	abstract [1] 14/1	<b>Anders [9]</b> 2/4 3/14 3/15 3/25
1	academic [1] 14/1	4/10 5/13 11/13 15/13 21/21
<b>10 [2]</b> 1/7 3/2	accept [2] 10/7 14/9	Anders' [2] 12/3 13/9
<b>1000 [2]</b> 2/17 2/22	acceptance [1] 8/13	another [7] 6/17 13/10 13/12
<b>128 [1]</b> 3/8 <b>1472 [1]</b> 10/16	accurate [1] 11/21	13/18 20/7 20/10 20/11
	<b>Act [3]</b> 12/10 13/3 14/17 <b>action [5]</b> 1/4 8/5 9/19 14/19	answers [1] 15/4 any [14] 5/7 5/8 5/9 5/11 9/17
2	15/5	10/18 10/23 11/21 12/22 12/25
<b>2000 [1]</b> 2/5	actions [4] 9/25 10/5 16/6	20/5 20/6 20/15 21/1
<b>2016 [1]</b> 9/11	20/22	anyone [1] 4/11
<b>2018 [6]</b> 6/5 9/11 12/16 17/2	activity [1] 9/24	anything [3] 13/7 13/25 15/14
21/18 22/18	add [1] 13/9	<b>APA [2]</b> 14/24 15/3
<b>2022 [3]</b> 1/7 3/2 23/9	additional [2] 8/14 8/16	apartment [1] 12/1
<b>2051 [3]</b> 12/11 12/12 13/4 <b>2116 [1]</b> 3/6	Additionally [1] 8/14	apologies [2] 3/11 4/7
<b>230 [1]</b> 2/12	administration [1] 14/23	apology [1] 4/9
	Administrative [1] 14/16	<b>appeal [4]</b> 19/9 19/10 21/11 21/13
3	adoption [2] 15/6 15/7 advisement [3] 21/6 22/1	appearance [4] 3/10 4/12 4/16
301 [1] 2/22	22/21	4/20
<b>326-8188 [1]</b> 2/23	advisory [3] 16/20 17/25 20/3	APPEARANCES [1] 2/2
3:01 [1] 3/2 3:46 ov 2446 [4] 3/6	affordable [1] 8/12	Appearing [1] 4/19
<b>3:16-cv-2116 [1]</b> 3/6 <b>3:16-cv-2116-SI [1]</b> 1/5	after [2] 7/1 10/5	appellate [1] 21/9
3:33 [1] 22/23	afternoon [3] 3/4 4/15 4/25	applicability [1] 6/5
	again [3] 17/7 19/6 20/16	applicable [1] 15/9
4	against [1] 19/14	application [1] 8/22 applied [13] 11/24 13/1 13/14
<b>42 [1]</b> 10/15	agency [16] 5/24 6/1 9/24 10/5 10/5 10/15 10/17 14/21 15/5	14/8 15/10 15/17 15/20 15/23
5	16/6 17/5 17/6 18/2 19/4 20/25	15/24 16/2 16/10 19/23 22/13
<b>503 [1]</b> 2/23	21/3	applies [5] 6/10 6/16 10/20
<b>515 [2]</b> 6/13 12/10	agency's [6] 6/20 10/1 10/8	13/11 17/1
<b>522 [1]</b> 2/8	10/10 10/13 10/18	apply [2] 21/15 22/14
6	ago [1] 12/24	applying [1] 17/10
	agree [4] 15/16 15/17 15/19	appreciate [4] 5/15 21/21
<b>600 [1]</b> 2/17	20/9	21/22 21/25 approval [1] 8/17
7	agreed [5] 11/24 12/9 12/19 12/19 13/3	approval [1] 9/17
<b>703</b> [1] 2/5	agreement [2] 13/2 17/15	approving [1] 10/25
	Agriculture [1] 1/8	arbitrary [1] 6/23

**been [8]** 5/1136/18-9/6110/6217/2 **change [5]** 8/739/12 9/17 10/18 16/21 20/13 20/24 21/2 Case 3:16-cv-02116-SI **are [18]** 3/5 3/7 4/20 5/10 5/19 before [4] 1/18 5/16 16/7 21/1 changed [2] 5/11 12/5 5/25 6/11 6/20 8/2 9/23 9/25 **beginning** [1] 6/18 **changing [1]** 12/13 10/2 10/23 11/2 12/21 12/21 behavior [2] 7/21 8/3 **choose [1]** 19/9 14/7 19/3 chosen [1] 21/1 being [4] 3/18 14/17 19/1 argue [2] 5/3 5/22 21/18 Circuit [3] 8/20 21/16 22/19 arguing [2] 4/8 20/16 believe [7] 5/19 12/4 12/4 15/1 **circumstances** [5] 5/11 11/22 argument [6] 3/7 5/18 8/6 8/15 16/12 18/22 21/4 12/5 12/15 13/18 16/14 21/22 **bell [1]** 14/16 cite [1] 22/11 arguments [2] 5/10 21/25 below [1] 23/4 cited [3] 8/6 22/8 22/10 articulated [1] 22/3 best [2] 4/5 22/18 civil [1] 12/14 articulation [1] 21/14 better [1] 3/22 claim [1] 9/20 as [29] between [2] 14/7 21/16 claiming [1] 7/4 as-applied [10] 11/24 13/14 bit [3] 14/15 21/20 22/19 claims [5] 5/19 6/11 7/5 10/4 14/8 15/10 15/17 15/20 15/23 blanket [1] 21/12 11/11 16/2 16/10 19/23 bonita [4] 2/21 2/23 23/9 23/10 clarification [1] 21/9 ask [4] 6/24 13/23 14/6 19/7 **both [6]** 3/23 5/10 5/22 6/23 **clarify [1]** 20/12 asking [2] 16/19 20/3 19/21 22/20 asks [1] 11/8 bothering [1] 16/10 **asserts** [1] 6/8 **bought** [1] 18/4 assessing [1] 7/5 **bound [1]** 12/10 assistance [2] 8/14 10/11 bring [5] 14/10 19/14 20/11 **Assistant** [1] 4/24 20/17 20/21 assisted [1] 10/11 **bringing [1]** 14/8 **assisting [1]** 8/12 **broadly [1]** 18/18 **assume [1]** 10/12 **brought [2]** 9/18 15/2 assumed [4] 6/12 7/16 9/6 burden [8] 7/19 7/19 7/24 8/1 17/3 8/5 8/22 11/3 11/6 assumes [1] 17/1 burdens [1] 8/11 assuming [1] 19/12 **buy [1]** 10/14 **assumption** [1] 16/24 assurance [1] 21/12 С **Attorney** [1] 4/24 CA [1] 2/5 **Attorney's [1]** 2/16 can [9] 3/16 4/2 4/4 4/5 8/3 **audio [1]** 3/17 13/5 15/23 18/7 19/14 19/2 19/21 **authorizes** [1] 9/20 can't [2] 13/21 20/13 available [1] 6/7 candidate [1] 14/25 Avenue [4] 2/8 2/12 2/17 2/22 cannot [1] 4/3 avoid [1] 20/21 capricious [1] 6/23 away [2] 19/8 19/12 care [26] awfully [2] 14/1 14/1 **CARE's [4]** 6/3 8/10 8/10 9/5 case [43] В 11/7 cases [4] 6/23 18/24 20/25 back [7] 3/21 11/15 14/24 21/2 15/13 16/9 21/14 21/17 cause [1] 23/6

Center [1] 2/7

certify [1] 23/4

cessation [24]

challenge [28]

9/14 10/25 11/7

challenging [1] 8/13

**certified** [1] 23/7

based [3] 16/11 16/17 19/19 basic [2] 16/24 16/25 be [37] became [2] 18/3 18/4 because [21] 4/7 6/10 6/12 7/7 7/14 8/1 8/22 9/5 10/22 11/2 13/5 16/1 16/18 17/6 17/12 18/4 18/10 19/16 20/17 22/12 22/13

ceased [4] 6/10 9/4 9/9 9/24 challenged [6] 6/11 6/19 8/5

clear [4] 5/17 7/20 18/8 18/8 clearer [1] 21/14 **clearly [2]** 16/4 18/13 clients [1] 8/12 Coastal [13] 9/7 9/17 10/9 10/12 10/13 12/18 12/22 13/2 14/2 16/12 17/14 18/4 21/17 colleague [1] 4/24 come [1] 11/15 comment [2] 15/17 19/10 **COMMUNITY [1]** 1/3 complain [2] 21/18 22/9 **complained [1]** 17/20 complaint [1] 13/20 complex [2] 12/1 13/11 concede [1] 5/18 concerned [4] 18/14 18/18 concerns [1] 19/13 conclude [1] 11/6 **concluded [1]** 22/23 conclusion [1] 7/23 conduct [10] 6/11 6/19 6/24 7/13 7/25 9/5 9/10 9/12 9/15 **confirmed** [1] 8/15 conformed [1] 23/7 connecting [1] 3/21 considering [1] 9/1 consistently [1] 7/19 continue [6] 5/21 8/9 8/9 8/16 9/11 17/5 continued [3] 6/5 19/4 22/14 continuing [1] 16/6 contradicts [1] 6/4 **contrary [4]** 5/25 6/14 6/20 9/13

Case 3:16-cv-02116-SI control [1] 10/8 correct [4] 3/14 18/12 19/1 23/5 could [10] 7/2 7/21 9/18 9/22 14/12 17/6 19/19 20/10 20/16 20/17 counsel [4] 3/9 5/3 5/6 8/15 County [9] 5/21 6/17 8/11 8/25 10/23 13/12 16/15 19/3 20/8 course [2] 11/16 15/10 **court [18]** 1/1 1/19 2/21 7/6 7/10 7/24 8/6 8/20 8/23 11/1 11/8 12/4 12/16 14/12 15/2 16/19 17/2 23/11 Court's [3] 6/4 7/12 9/3 Courthouse [1] 2/21 covenant [1] 12/19 create [1] 17/23 creating [1] 17/11 **Critically [1]** 7/18 **CRR [2]** 2/21 23/10 **CSR [2]** 2/21 23/10 current [1] 20/5 **currently [1]** 8/23 cv [2] 1/5 3/6

## D

**DATE [1]** 23/10 day [1] 22/21 deal [2] 16/3 17/15 dealing [1] 18/1 deals [1] 16/2 decided [4] 7/2 7/15 11/1 17/2 decision [24] **decisions** [1] 10/14 declaratory [4] 5/22 6/24 19/21 E 20/14 defendant [2] 4/19 20/22 defendants [14] 1/9 2/15 6/10 7/1 7/3 7/14 7/20 7/23 8/4 9/4 9/9 11/3 11/6 20/2 defendants' [6] 3/7 7/21 8/1 8/21 9/17 11/9 deny [1] 11/8 denying [1] 12/16 **Department** [1] 1/8 derivative [2] 10/1 10/16 **described** [1] 7/19 designed [1] 17/4 **determine** [1] 9/21 **determining [2]** 6/21 7/17 development [11] 10/3 14/11 16/16 16/20 17/12 17/20 18/1

19/13 19/15 139/20 12/16/13 16/27/2 enjoined 11/3 of/32 developments [1] 10/3 enter [5] 3/9 4/11 did [4] 7/14 7/23 8/4 9/18 didn't [3] 20/10 22/11 22/14 differ [1] 12/3 difference [2] 15/19 21/16 different [5] 12/15 17/13 20/5 20/6 22/17 direction [2] 21/21 22/3 directly [1] 10/1 disagreed [1] 7/6 disconnect [1] 3/21 discussion [1] 7/11 dismiss [9] 3/7 7/4 11/9 12/17 13/23 18/9 19/8 20/3 22/20 dismissal [1] 13/24 **dismissed** [1] 9/13 dispute [1] 16/13 disputed [1] 12/2 **DISTRICT [6]** 1/1 1/2 1/19 2/16 example [1] 8/3 2/21 15/2 do [16] 4/2 4/5 4/11 4/16 10/17 13/5 14/12 14/15 15/13 15/16 17/16 18/2 20/13 20/21 21/21 22/16 **Docket** [1] 3/7 doctrine [1] 21/10 does [8] 7/13 8/7 9/17 10/22 11/1 15/24 16/3 21/15 doesn't [5] 12/1 13/6 13/14 17/22 21/15 doing [1] 20/14 don't [11] 3/19 11/21 12/25 13/11 13/25 15/4 18/22 18/24 19/23 20/18 20/19

each [1] 20/25 Eagle [16] 6/12 12/1 12/8 14/8 15/18 16/11 16/19 17/15 17/16 17/17 17/18 17/21 18/19 18/21 19/16 19/16 earlier [5] 9/3 10/2 10/4 10/5 18/8 Ed [1] 4/17 Edward [1] 2/7 efficient [1] 5/5 either [2] 3/16 20/19 eligibility [1] 6/21 **eliaible [1]** 10/9 **ELIHPA [2]** 6/21 8/9 else [5] 4/11 13/10 13/13 13/19 12/24 13/21 elsewhere [1] 16/15

dramatically [1] 12/6

enter [5] 3/9 4/11 4/16 4/20 12/9 entered [2] 12/23 13/2 ENTERPRISES [1] 1/4 **enters** [1] 13/19 entitled [5] 5/21 10/22 16/4 19/3 23/6 erroneously [1] 6/7 **especially** [1] 22/2 essentially [3] 16/19 19/5 20/3 et [3] 1/8 3/5 3/6 **evaluate** [1] 5/24 even [2] 12/11 20/15 events [1] 16/11 ever [1] 21/10 everybody [2] 12/20 14/4 **everyone** [1] 3/4 evidence [3] 9/8 9/23 12/22 exception [18] 6/6 6/9 6/15 7/7 7/8 7/11 7/16 7/18 8/19 10/20 10/24 16/5 16/25 17/4 18/11 20/20 21/5 22/13 exist [1] 9/11 **expected [2]** 7/21 8/3 **explain** [1] 4/3 **extremely [1]** 8/24

## F

facial [4] 14/10 15/9 15/22 19/24 fact [6] 9/16 12/6 12/8 12/23 16/2 20/24 facts [2] 13/17 13/20 **factual [2]** 5/7 10/3 failed [1] 11/5 **February [2]** 6/4 17/2 February 8th [1] 17/2 federal [1] 15/25 feel [1] 21/11 fell [1] 7/7 Fifth [1] 2/8 fight [1] 4/22 file [3] 6/16 8/16 11/10 filed [5] 5/23 6/17 7/4 18/9 20/1 filing [1] 13/20 final [6] 14/19 14/21 15/5 15/6 15/7 15/8 financial [2] 8/10 8/14 financing [4] 10/14 12/9 12/20 find [1] 14/20 finding [1] 8/12

Case 3:16-cv-02116-SI fine [5] 3/22 4/9 17/18 18/2 18/25 first [7] 3/9 5/6 6/19 9/18 11/14 15/16 22/14 **floor [1]** 5/13 focusing [1] 7/12 **follow [1]** 14/6 **follow-up [1]** 14/6 **follows [1]** 10/19 force [2] 9/19 9/22 foregoing [1] 23/4 **forms [1]** 6/19 forward [2] 15/23 19/21 found [1] 8/21 founded [1] 11/21 four [1] 12/24 **Francisco** [1] 2/5 **FRED [1]** 1/3 free [2] 7/15 9/14 front [1] 18/24 frustrate [1] 8/9 fundamental [1] 21/3 fundamentally [1] 12/6 further [1] 10/22 future [12] 6/2 8/16 8/25 9/13 10/25 13/21 16/22 18/14 18/15 18/19 20/11 20/16 G **GE [14]** 7/2 9/5 9/16 9/19 9/23

16/11 17/3 18/15 19/5 general [4] 14/11 14/14 14/22 14/23 generalized [1] 14/22 generally [1] 14/18 get [3] 19/14 21/14 22/2 **Gideon [2]** 2/4 4/10 give [3] 3/23 11/16 22/19 qiven [1] 14/16 giving [1] 21/11 glad [1] 3/20 go [3] 15/13 15/23 22/14 goes [2] 19/8 19/12 going [10] 4/7 5/16 12/21 13/17 17/15 19/5 19/21 21/6 21/18 22/3 Golden [16] 6/12 12/1 12/8 14/8 15/18 16/11 16/18 17/15

18/21 19/16 19/16

22/21

good [5] 3/4 4/15 4/25 14/3

9/25 10/10 10/11 10/21 15/24

18/23 20/19 22/22 18/4 19/2 21/11 hurdle [1] 8/24 I'd [4] 5/17 14/25 18/23 21/13 **I'II [8]** 3/9 3/20 4/22 11/15 17/16 17/17 17/18 17/21 18/19 19/10 21/20 22/1 22/19 **I'm [11]** 4/7 4/23 16/13 16/14

21/21 22/2

**99660** h 2 h 7 1 3 9

grant [1] 13/23

hand [1] 21/8

harder [1] 4/23

19/20 20/25

have [37]

19/4 20/21

helpful [1] 21/8

hey [1] 20/11

20/24 21/6 21/11 21/18 21/18

16/14

18/9

**J've<sub>E</sub>[3]**<sub>16</sub>5/<del>2</del>7/20/24/21/7 **ayocument** (139 Filed 06/27/2 government [3] 13/5 15/25 identical [1] 20/7 ignores [1] 6/4 **government's [1]** 12/18 **II [2]** 12/1 12/8 illegal [7] 6/24 7/13 7/25 8/13 9/24 16/6 21/4 granting [2] 5/5 5/15 immunity [1] 14/17 impact [1] 12/14 had [3] 13/7 21/17 22/17 importantly [1] 12/9 **improper** [1] 8/7 handle [3] 16/17 16/21 17/20 improperly [1] 11/3 handled [2] 17/21 19/20 **INC [1]** 1/4 handles [1] 19/13 income [1] 17/19 handling [1] 16/21 increase [2] 8/10 10/10 hands [1] 12/18 independent [1] 19/1 happen [2] 13/21 20/16 **individual** [1] 5/18 initial [2] 7/2 10/16 has [16] 6/12 9/5 9/11 9/24 injunction [1] 6/25 11/5 12/8 12/19 12/22 13/3 injunctive [3] 5/22 19/22 20/14 14/19 15/22 16/7 16/20 19/12 insofar [1] 15/19 instance [2] 20/25 22/14 **Instead [1]** 6/11 haven't [1] 22/9 instinct [1] 20/17 having [5] 12/23 15/25 17/14 insulted [1] 21/12 insurmountable [1] 8/24 hear [4] 3/17 4/2 11/15 17/18 intended [3] 10/24 20/21 21/5 heard [2] 3/22 3/23 interest [1] 12/23 hearing [4] 1/15 5/15 16/13 interested [2] 13/13 13/20 interesting [1] 14/13 **heavy [2]** 7/19 8/5 invite [1] 3/9 held [2] 7/12 17/2 invokina [1] 8/18 involve [1] 13/6 here [9] 3/5 3/7 4/23 14/7 involved [3] 14/4 17/18 20/24 15/17 16/23 17/13 17/13 22/8 involving [2] 16/12 18/20 is [72] Hillsboro [1] 2/12 issue [5] 6/3 10/21 16/3 17/9 **Honor [6]** 4/13 4/18 11/19 17/25 issues [1] 5/16 **HONORABLE [1]** 1/18 it [48] housing [15] 2/4 5/20 8/12 it's [15] 3/22 5/5 11/24 12/13 12/10 12/19 12/22 13/2 13/3 12/15 14/1 14/7 15/9 16/5 13/10 14/2 16/12 17/14 17/19 16/18 17/16 17/25 19/17 19/18 20/13 how [5] 14/11 16/20 16/21 20/4 its [16] 6/22 6/25 7/15 8/7 8/12 9/6 9/12 9/15 9/23 10/2 10/5 however [2] 5/19 15/24 10/11 10/17 12/13 15/25 19/12

J

**Johnson [3]** 2/7 4/16 4/17 joined [1] 4/23 Josh [1] 4/24 **Joshua [1]** 2/15 judge [15] 1/19 3/4 3/11 4/23 5/14 11/24 12/14 12/17 13/2 13/9 13/11 13/22 14/13 14/24

Filed 06/27/22 211/9 abt 12/36 13/23 18/9 22/20 low [1] 17/19 Case 3:16-cv-02116-SI judge... [1] 21/11 low-income [1] 17/19 move [1] 20/2 judgment [1] 11/10 Mr [5] 2/4 2/7 2/11 2/15 2/15 juncture [1] 14/1 М Mr. [22] 3/14 3/15 3/25 4/16 June [1] 23/9 made [4] 9/11 10/5 10/6 18/8 4/19 4/25 5/1 5/13 11/13 11/15 jurisdiction [1] 15/1 make [7] 5/9 5/17 10/7 14/20 11/17 11/18 12/3 13/9 14/5 just [12] 3/17 8/22 12/13 12/23 18/7 18/19 19/10 14/6 15/12 15/13 15/15 15/16 12/24 13/11 14/21 15/2 19/1 making [1] 11/25 21/21 21/25 19/8 20/10 20/16 managed [1] 14/2 Mr. Anders [7] 3/14 3/15 3/25 justifies [1] 6/7 manner [1] 6/23 5/13 11/13 15/13 21/21 K many [1] 12/17 Mr. Anders' [2] 12/3 13/9 Market [1] 2/5 Mr. Johnson [1] 4/16 keep [1] 13/22 Martin [11] 2/15 4/19 4/25 Mr. Keller [1] 5/1 Keller [3] 2/15 4/24 5/1 11/15 11/17 11/18 14/5 14/6 Mr. Martin [10] 4/19 4/25 11/15 **key [1]** 6/8 15/12 15/15 21/25 11/17 11/18 14/5 14/6 15/12 know [10] 3/19 5/2 12/18 13/12 Martin's [1] 15/16 15/15 21/25 13/16 14/16 15/4 15/6 18/23 material [2] 5/7 5/9 **Mr. Martin's [1]** 15/16 19/1 matter [2] 12/2 19/17 much [3] 12/13 13/6 22/4 may [7] 1/7 3/2 16/15 17/18 my [11] 3/11 3/12 4/7 4/23 5/7 17/19 18/21 20/11 5/12 11/16 14/16 18/7 20/9 **Laidlaw [2]** 7/12 7/15 MCFALLS [3] 1/3 1/3 3/5 20/17 lapsed [1] 15/22 me [15] 3/22 5/5 5/6 5/11 14/6 late [3] 12/11 12/12 13/4 Ν 15/13 16/10 16/18 16/19 17/22 law [5] 2/4 2/7 5/25 20/22 22/6 17/23 17/25 18/7 18/24 19/7 **N.E [1]** 2/12 lawsuit [3] 6/16 19/14 20/2 **mean [1]** 14/15 **namely [1]** 9/6 lawsuits [1] 8/16 means [1] 15/21 **National** [1] 2/4 leading [1] 14/25 meet [3] 7/24 8/1 8/4 need [1] 14/20 leaning [1] 21/21 mere [2] 7/13 7/25 needed [1] 4/9 leans [1] 5/4 merely [2] 6/10 9/14 needs [1] 5/20 least [1] 17/16 merits [1] 21/2 neither [1] 4/4 legal [3] 2/11 5/9 14/19 met [3] 8/18 8/22 11/6 **new [12]** 6/16 11/22 12/8 12/9 lengthy [1] 7/11 MICHAEL [5] 1/3 1/18 2/11 12/20 12/23 13/6 13/17 13/18 let [5] 14/2 14/6 15/13 18/7 4/11 4/13 17/14 19/14 20/2 19/7 might [6] 13/13 13/20 13/21 next [1] 12/10 let's [5] 3/23 14/2 14/9 19/7 Ninth [3] 8/20 21/15 22/18 17/17 18/17 19/25 19/8 mind [3] 3/18 12/13 14/16 no [15] 1/5 2/8 3/6 4/9 6/9 8/22 like [6] 3/13 5/17 13/7 15/2 ministerial [2] 10/6 10/10 9/8 9/11 9/19 10/20 12/6 12/22 19/15 22/5 misapplied [2] 16/1 18/21 17/8 20/9 21/10 likely [2] 16/16 16/21 mission [1] 8/10 none [1] 17/24 **limitation** [1] 15/21 misunderstanding [2] 16/23 **nonparty** [1] 6/12 **limitations [3]** 15/10 16/3 18/6 nonprofit [2] 10/9 12/8 19/25 misunderstood [2] 5/7 5/8 Northwest [13] 9/7 9/16 10/9 limited [1] 14/17 10/12 10/13 12/18 12/22 13/2 moment [1] 19/11 **limiting** [1] 6/7 months [1] 12/24 14/2 16/12 17/14 18/4 21/17 **LISA [2]** 1/3 3/5 moot [16] 5/19 6/11 7/6 7/9 not [54] litigant [1] 21/10 7/14 7/17 9/5 10/3 10/4 16/13 **Notably [1]** 8/20 **litigation** [1] 14/3 17/1 17/3 18/3 18/3 18/4 18/10 notice [1] 12/20 little [4] 4/22 13/5 21/20 22/19 mootness [5] 7/5 7/8 7/17 notwithstanding [1] 9/3 live [3] 5/21 13/1 13/25 now [14] 4/6 9/4 12/17 13/6 17/10 17/11 living [2] 5/20 19/3 15/5 16/9 16/13 17/14 17/23 more [5] 8/11 12/13 18/23 loan [6] 6/13 6/21 7/2 9/6 19/23 20/12 20/24 21/12 21/17 21/20 22/19 10/13 18/5 Moreover [1] 6/14 **number [1]** 10/11 longer [3] 6/9 10/20 12/7 **most [2]** 5/5 12/9 look [1] 19/15 motion [10] 1/15 3/7 5/5 7/4 **looked [1]** 12/16

O Case 3:16-cv-02116-SI	Party 15 en/933/21=12/508/27/2	pri <b>vate [1]</b> 012/32
object [1] 16/16	19/2	probably [3] 11/16 14/24 22/18
	past [2] 16/17 19/20	problem [5] 17/16 17/17 17/23
obviously [1] 5/10	pause [1] 3/24	19/16 19/25
off [1] 14/15	payments [1] 18/15	problems [1] 18/19
offer [1] 10/8	pending [3] 8/23 10/23 11/2	Procedure [1] 14/17
offered [1] 7/3	people [2] 5/20 19/3	procedures [3] 8/2 14/11
Office [1] 2/16		14/14
Official [1] 23/11	perfectly [2] 18/25 18/25	
Okay [2] 3/16 4/7	personnel [1] 8/10	proceed [1] 11/10
old [2] 7/15 9/15	perspective [1] 12/4	proceedings [4] 1/17 3/24
once [1] 9/13	Pijanowski [2] 2/11 4/13	22/23 23/5
one [1] 21/19	place [4] 8/2 9/11 12/21 12/21	process [1] 9/1
only [2] 10/21 15/22	plaintiff [1] 11/4	program [3] 5/25 6/22 14/23
operate [1] 5/25	plaintiffs [14] 1/5 2/4 3/9 4/10	project [7] 2/4 12/12 13/1 13/1
operation [1] 6/22	4/14 4/17 6/19 6/23 7/6 9/18	13/12 13/18 14/2
opinion [18] 5/3 5/4 5/8 5/17	9/21 11/9 14/7 21/2	projects [1] 17/19
6/4 6/8 6/15 8/21 9/3 9/4 11/5	plaintiffs' [6] 5/6 5/18 6/11 7/5	proper [2] 8/8 14/12
11/20 13/17 16/20 17/25 20/3	8/6 10/4	properly [2] 9/21 11/6
	plans [1] 9/12	properties [7] 8/17 12/2 16/15
22/15 22/17	pleased [1] 18/23	16/22 17/24 18/16 18/20
opinion's [1] 10/19	point [8] 13/5 13/9 14/20 18/7	property [11] 7/3 8/25 14/9
opportunity [1] 11/17	18/13 18/25 22/8 22/11	15/18 16/11 16/19 18/5 20/7
oral [1] 8/15	pointed [3] 7/24 13/16 18/14	20/10 20/12 20/15
ord.uscourts.gov [1] 2/23	policies [2] 5/24 9/10	protected [1] 12/12
order [5] 5/3 5/8 5/12 11/20	policy [1] 14/22	protections [2] 12/21 13/4
13/17	Portland [4] 1/9 2/9 2/17 2/22	provide [2] 10/13 18/23
ordinary [2] 7/4 7/17	position [2] 9/18 10/18	providing [1] 8/14
<b>OREGON [5]</b> 1/2 1/9 2/7 2/11	potential [1] 13/19	purchase [2] 10/8 10/10
2/16	potentially [1] 20/25	purchased [1] 6/12
organization [1] 5/20	-	
original [2] 16/9 23/6	practice [2] 16/6 21/3	purely [2] 17/16 18/1
originally [1] 17/21	practices [7] 9/15 14/11 14/14 16/17 17/5 17/7 19/4	purpose [1] 7/11
origins [1] 7/11	procioaly [41, 20/20	purposes [1] 5/17
other [12] 5/10 8/22 10/23 11/2	precisely [1] 20/20	put [2] 12/20 22/16
12/1 16/15 16/22 17/19 17/24	prefer [1] 3/17	Q
18/15 18/20 21/8	prejudice [2] 13/24 19/9	question [8] 11/14 11/16 14/13
otherwise [1] 17/6	prepaid [2] 7/3 19/5	15/4 15/14 15/16 16/9 20/9
our [1] 20/5	prepay [4] 6/21 20/8 20/10 20/12	
out [8] 7/24 10/14 12/17 13/16		R
18/14 21/13 22/2 22/14	prepayment [15] 6/17 8/8 8/13 8/17 8/22 9/22 10/2 10/17	ramifications [1] 14/19
outcome [1] 14/4	10/23 12/7 12/23 13/11 13/13	rather [1] 14/21
outnumbered [1] 4/21		<b>RD [6]</b> 7/23 8/7 8/8 9/11 9/21
outside [1] 10/8	13/19 18/15	10/24
outstanding [1] 10/12	prepayments [4] 5/25 10/25	<b>RD's [2]</b> 8/13 9/1
over [3] 17/7 17/7 18/5	11/2 18/14	reaching [3] 7/10 7/23 8/4
owner [6] 10/14 12/7 12/8	preservation [3] 9/23 9/23	really [5] 5/14 12/17 18/18 22/7
12/14 13/6 13/8	9/25	22/10
owner's [1] 6/21	preserve [1] 9/19	reason [2] 3/12 17/10
	preserved [1] 9/16	reasonably [2] 7/21 8/3
P	prevent [1] 10/24	reasons [1] 11/8
p.m [2] 3/2 22/23	preventing [1] 6/25	receive [1] 16/4
papers [1] 16/14	previous [3] 13/8 18/9 22/15	received [1] 8/17
part [1] 20/22	previously [7] 5/2 11/1 17/10	recognize [1] 13/24
parties [4] 10/6 11/23 14/7	20/13 22/8 22/10 22/11	recognizes [1] 12/5
15/17	primary [1] 6/3	reconnect [1] 3/16
	prior [1] 12/14	
1	İ	

17/12 17/19 138/1 19/13 18/15 /2 since [5] 35/4 5/51 6/18 11/22 19/19 20/13 R Case 3:16-cv-02116-SI record [1] 23/5 sir [2] 3/14 3/15 recur [4] 7/22 8/3 8/6 11/7 S **situation [4]** 16/25 18/1 21/16 recurrence [1] 6/25 **S.W [3]** 2/8 2/17 2/22 22/17 reflect [1] 10/17 said [3] 15/15 18/17 18/20 **situations [2]** 19/14 19/20 regard [2] 11/25 13/1 sale [4] 7/3 9/19 9/23 9/25 skeptical [1] 21/7 **regarding [1]** 16/20 same [5] 8/1 9/10 17/6 17/20 **so [18]** 4/8 4/10 5/13 13/6 regulation [1] 9/20 17/23 13/23 14/19 16/1 17/25 19/12 regulations [9] 5/24 6/20 8/1 San [1] 2/5 19/19 19/24 19/25 20/1 20/18 8/7 9/10 9/15 11/1 15/25 19/24 **saw [1]** 16/13 20/19 21/10 22/4 22/11 rejected [2] 17/10 17/11 say [7] 12/11 14/6 14/15 14/25 **sold [2]** 9/6 9/16 relate [3] 12/1 13/14 19/16 19/8 19/18 19/19 **solved [1]** 19/17 relating [4] 5/16 14/8 15/18 saying [5] 16/13 17/9 17/18 some [4] 3/11 14/20 22/5 22/10 16/10 18/2 21/23 **somebody [1]** 13/10 relatively [1] 22/2 says [3] 11/17 16/5 20/11 **something [2]** 17/13 18/6 reliance [1] 6/20 scenario [3] 12/7 12/25 13/19 somewhere [3] 13/13 13/18 relied [2] 5/9 8/6 scenarios [1] 13/7 13/21 relief [7] 5/22 6/7 6/24 10/22 scope [2] 6/6 21/9 soon [1] 22/2 16/3 19/22 20/15 **Sean [1]** 2/15 **sort [2]** 14/20 20/17 relieve [1] 15/24 second [3] 2/12 6/22 9/25 sought [3] 5/23 9/21 20/8 rely [1] 9/14 **Secretary [2]** 1/7 3/6 **sounds [1]** 3/13 relying [2] 6/1 8/20 **Section [3]** 6/13 10/15 12/10 sovereign [1] 14/17 remain [2] 12/9 12/21 see [2] 4/2 18/7 **specific [1]** 20/15 remaining [1] 11/11 seek [2] 8/25 20/10 specifically [3] 5/23 8/21 17/4 remedy [1] 21/5 seeking [1] 12/7 **speculative [2]** 17/17 19/17 rental [1] 10/11 seeks [1] 20/12 spend [1] 8/11 repayment [2] 8/25 9/2 seen [3] 3/18 3/23 3/23 **spoken [1]** 18/17 repeat [1] 20/23 sense [1] 18/19 squarely [1] 22/8 **REPORTER [2]** 2/21 23/11 sent [2] 5/2 5/12 **standard [2]** 7/5 7/17 representing [3] 4/10 21/23 served [1] 22/18 standards [1] 8/8 21/24 Services [1] 2/11 start [1] 8/8 **requests** [1] 8/13 serving [1] 5/20 **State [1]** 2/8 required [3] 9/14 10/7 10/15 set [3] 12/15 13/17 13/18 **stated [2]** 5/7 8/23 requirements [1] 8/18 sets [1] 14/15 statement [5] 6/8 6/14 9/9 9/12 RESOURCE [1] 1/4 settle [1] 21/1 10/19 respect [5] 6/3 6/5 17/3 17/8 several [1] 7/24 states [5] 1/1 1/19 2/16 2/21 21/24 shared [1] 11/22 9/4 respond [2] 11/17 15/14 **sharply [1]** 12/3 **statute [7]** 9/20 10/7 10/15 response [1] 20/4 **shifts [2]** 7/18 11/3 15/9 15/21 16/3 19/25 restrictions [1] 13/3 **short [1]** 11/5 **statutory [1]** 15/21 restrictive [1] 12/19 **should [7]** 6/1 6/16 6/16 9/22 still [4] 8/2 19/12 19/21 21/7 return [1] 7/15 12/11 14/3 21/10 **stop [1]** 16/5 reversed [1] 21/19 **show [3]** 7/20 9/17 11/2 **strange** [1] 21/23 revert [2] 9/15 17/6 showing [3] 3/12 8/5 11/7 **Street [1]** 2/5 review [1] 8/8 shumway [4] 2/21 2/23 23/9 strike [1] 17/22 right [8] 3/13 4/5 4/25 14/21 23/10 strikes [4] 16/18 16/19 17/23 15/6 15/8 21/12 21/13 **SI [1]** 1/5 17/25 rights [2] 12/14 19/2 sides [2] 5/10 14/3 **submit [1]** 22/5 **RMR [2]** 2/21 23/10 signature [2] 23/7 23/7 **subsequent** [1] 10/3 Room [1] 2/22 signed [1] 17/14 substantive [1] 5/16 **Rosemere [1]** 8/21 signing [1] 23/4 such [2] 9/1 9/20 rule [3] 15/6 15/7 15/8 **SIMON [4]** 1/18 3/5 3/11 5/14 sufficient [1] 7/25 ruling [1] 11/22 simply [7] 6/14 9/8 13/14 16/2 suggest [1] 18/24 **Rural [10]** 14/11 16/16 16/20 17/12 20/2 20/16 Suite [3] 2/5 2/12 2/17

<b>S</b> Case 3:16-cv-02116-SI	those 112 1/39 Filed 06/27/2	<b>V</b> Page 31 of 32
summary [1] 11/10		versus [1] 3/5
support [2] 2/8 9/9	three [1] 20/25	very [5] 13/5 21/7 21/8 21/8
suppose [1] 19/7	<b>Thus [2]</b> 8/18 10/16	22/4
supposed [1] 16/5	Tillamook [10] 5/21 6/17 8/11	video [2] 3/10 3/12
Supreme [1] 7/12	8/23 8/25 10/23 13/12 16/15	Videoconference [1] 1/16
	19/3 20/8	VILSACK [2] 1/7 3/6
T	time [4] 5/12 8/11 18/9 18/13	violate [2] 8/9 20/22
take [5] 10/15 14/24 16/6 21/6	times [1] 7/24	voluntarily [2] 7/1 10/1
22/1	title [1] 12/11	voluntary [22] 6/6 6/9 6/9 6/15
taken [1] 22/21	too [1] 18/17	7/7 7/16 7/18 8/19 10/20 10/24
talking [1] 20/15	took [1] 18/5	16/5 16/25 17/4 17/11 17/22
telephone [2] 2/15 4/23	totally [1] 17/13	18/10 18/21 20/20 21/4 21/9
tell [3] 5/6 5/11 21/7	towards [1] 5/5	21/15 22/13
tenants [1] 13/4	transcript [3] 1/17 23/5 23/6	voucher [2] 5/25 6/22
tentative [15] 5/2 5/4 5/8 5/12	transfer [1] 12/11	
5/17 6/3 6/8 6/15 9/4 10/19	trial [1] 21/11	W
11/5 11/20 11/22 13/16 22/16	true [1] 9/8	wait [1] 3/20
tentatively [1] 22/3	try [4] 3/16 3/21 3/23 22/1	waiver [1] 14/17
tethered [1] 14/18	trying [1] 17/23	walk [1] 19/25
than [6] 3/23 12/13 12/15	turn [1] 5/6	want [9] 3/20 3/21 4/11 4/16
14/21 18/23 22/17	turns [1] 21/13	11/14 14/20 19/21 20/12 20/14
thank [11] 5/14 11/12 11/13	two [2] 6/18 20/24	wanted [2] 14/10 15/7
11/19 14/5 15/12 16/8 22/4	type [4] 12/25 13/19 14/25 20/2	wanting [1] 5/21
22/20 22/21 22/22	types [1] 19/13	warrant [1] 13/20
that [137]	U	was [23] 5/23 6/24 7/3 7/8 7/25
that's [19] 3/22 4/9 12/2 12/15		9/16 9/21 10/9 10/10 10/15
12/25 13/11 13/13 13/17 14/13	U.S [2] 4/24 15/1	13/7 15/2 16/9 17/3 17/12
16/4 17/2 17/8 17/25 18/3	U.S.C [1] 10/15	17/12 18/10 18/10 18/25 20/20
20/20 21/4 21/20 21/23 22/10	ultimately [1] 7/6	21/1 21/5 22/13
their [5] 7/1 8/4 11/6 11/10	under [7] 7/4 7/8 7/16 15/2 21/6 22/1 22/21	way [11] 15/22 16/16 17/20
16/17		17/21 18/2 19/10 19/13 19/19
them [3] 6/1 20/23 21/11	underlying [2] 17/1 17/9 understand [1] 17/9	20/13 21/23 22/9
then [3] 11/15 13/20 15/14	understand [1] 17/9 undertook [1] 7/10	ways [2] 7/15 12/17
there [15] 3/24 6/18 9/8 9/19	undisputed [1] 14/7	we [32]
10/2 11/21 15/8 15/9 16/15	unfortunately [1] 4/4	we'll [1] 3/17
17/19 20/11 21/1 22/7 22/9	Unit [1] 2/8	<b>We're [1]</b> 17/15
22/10	UNITED [4] 1/1 1/19 2/16 2/21	welcome [4] 5/3 5/9 5/10 15/14
there's [9] 5/11 12/11 12/22	units [1] 10/11	well [11] 3/13 3/18 4/4 4/15
12/25 13/4 13/5 13/25 17/24	unknown [1] 13/14	11/21 12/10 13/10 15/2 19/7
21/16	unlikely [1] 8/24	20/6 22/12
thereby [1] 6/6	unrelated [1] 16/18	well-founded [1] 11/21
therefore [2] 18/2 20/14	untethered [1] 16/18	were [9] 7/5 9/10 10/6 10/6
these [3] 11/8 19/13 19/20	until [3] 7/3 12/11 13/4	10/8 10/14 10/16 15/8 15/10
they [9] 10/16 14/10 14/12 15/6	up [2] 3/12 14/6	what [21] 13/10 13/10 13/21
16/1 17/21 19/19 19/21 21/11	<b>upon [4]</b> 5/9 16/11 16/17 19/19	14/3 14/12 15/20 16/4 16/13
they're [1] 16/21	us [2] 5/15 22/5	16/23 17/2 17/9 17/17 17/25
things [4] 16/17 16/21 16/21 20/14	USDA [2] 12/13 13/2	19/15 20/1 20/4 20/9 20/20 21/4 21/17 21/17
20/14  think [27]	<b>USDA's [1]</b> 11/25	whatever [3] 3/17 5/4 11/17
third [5] 2/17 2/22 9/6 10/6	use [2] 12/19 13/3	whatsoever [1] 9/12
19/2	used [1] 7/18	when [6] 5/23 12/15 13/7 13/12
this [48]	using [4] 5/24 8/8 10/25 17/6	13/18 21/14
THOMAS [2] 1/7 3/6		where [7] 10/9 12/3 12/15
11.011.7.0 [2] 1// 0/0		1

W Case 3:16-cv-02116-SI Document 139 Filed 06/27/22 Page 32 of 32 where... [4] 16/16 16/25 20/21 20/25 whether [3] 9/21 15/20 19/5 which [7] 7/12 8/9 19/2 20/22 21/3 21/22 21/24 **who [1]** 19/3 why [4] 4/3 17/10 18/3 22/11 will [11] 8/5 8/8 8/9 8/11 8/25 9/1 11/7 17/20 21/12 22/1 22/9 wish [3] 3/21 5/4 5/10 withdraw [1] 10/2 withdrawal [1] 10/17 withdrew [2] 7/1 10/5 within [3] 7/7 15/1 18/10 without [6] 13/24 14/3 17/7 19/4 19/8 23/6 woefully [1] 4/20 won't [1] 18/2 **WOODRING [1]** 1/3 world [1] 12/20 worry [1] 21/10 would [29] wouldn't [3] 3/18 19/15 20/6 wrong [3] 6/14 10/23 21/18 **wrongful** [1] 8/2 yes [5] 3/15 4/1 4/13 4/17 4/22 you [65] you're [8] 5/3 15/14 16/13 17/9 20/15 21/13 21/22 21/24 you've [1] 22/8 your [22] 3/10 4/11 4/13 4/16 4/18 4/20 5/15 11/19 11/20 13/16 15/4 16/14 16/14 17/23 18/8 18/22 18/25 20/19 21/21 21/25 22/15 22/22 **yours [1]** 5/13